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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF "SON OF SAM" LAWS
AFTER SIMON & SCHUSTER v. NEW STATE CRIME
VICTIMS BOARD
I. INTRODUCTION
A "Son of Sam" law is an antiprofit statute requir-
ing criminals to surrender all proceeds received from
the sale and publication of their memoirs.' New
York's "Son of Sam" statute was the first of its kind
and acted as a model for many other states and the
federal government. 2 This article will review "Son of
Sam" laws in general, focusing on New York's
Executive Law 632-a which was recently held uncon-
stitutional by the Supreme Court in Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Board.' This arti-
cle will also examine New York's recently revised
"Son of Sam" law and, based on the Supreme Court's
analysis, propose the elements of a "Son of Sam" law
which could possibly withstand constitutional review.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Origin of the "Son of Sam" Law
New York Executive Law 632-a was enacted in
1977 in response to the sensationalism and mass
media coverage of the serial killer, David Berkowitz
a/k/a "Son of Sam."' Even before Berkowitz was
apprehended, it was apparent that the notoriety sur-
rounding his heinous crimes would give him the
opportunity to realize a large profit from the sale of
his story. Ironically, the public supplied the demand
for these stories, as well as the force behind the legis-
lation to suppress these books. The "Son of Sam" law
was enacted to quiet the public outcry in reaction to
the enormous profits earned by criminals for the pub-
lication of their stories.5 New York State Senator
Emmanuel Gold, sponsor of the bill, stated in his
memorandum to Congress that:
It is abhorrent to one's sense of justice
and decency that an individual such as
the fourty-four caliber killer (Berkowitz)
can expect to receive large sums of
money for his story once he is captured
while five people are dead, and other
people were injured as a result of his
conduct. This bill would make it clear
that in all criminal situations, the victim
must be more important than the crimi-
nal.6
More specifically, Executive Law 632-a required
the surrender to the State Crime Victims
Compensation Board ("Board") of any profits gained
from a criminal act by way of a movie, book, or mag-
azine article. 7 The law also required a publisher to
surrender to the Board any contract made with a
criminal for the publication of a book." However,
Executive Law 632-a was not limited to criminals in
the ordinary sense, but applied to those "accused or
convicted" of a crime, or who "admitted" to a crime in
his or her book.9 Further, the publisher had to relin-
quish to the Board profits due to the criminal source
of the work with respect to any expression of his or
her "thoughts, feelings, opinions, or emotions" regard-
ing the crime or "with respect to any reenactment" of
the crime.'" The money paid to the Board was to be
put in an escrow account; these funds would go to
any victim of the crime in satisfaction of a civil judg-
ment for damages against the "criminal" obtained in
an action brought within five years of the establish-
ment of the escrow account." If the charges against
the defendant were dismissed, or the defendant was
acquitted, the escrow account funds were returned to
the defendant.'" However, a person found not guilty
by reason of insanity was "deemed to be a convicted
person" and therefore subject to the restrictions of the
statute.'3 Prior to paying over the monies, the Board
would pay off any subrogation claims of the state for
monies paid out to victims by the Board prior to any
civil judgments." Additionally, the Board would pay
all creditors who present "lawful claims, including
state or local government tax authorities."
Based on New York state administrative regula-
tion, the Board had the authority to investigate con-
tracts not voluntarily submitted to it. After an adminis-
trative hearing, the Board could enter a final decision
bringing a contract within the scope of its authority.'
If actions were pending after five years, the Board
would immediately pay over any moneys in the
escrow account to such person or his legal represen-
tative.' 7
Although the statute received enormous publicity
and incited much debate, its application was very lim-
ited. Since the law's enactment in 1977, only $164,944
in proceeds owed to criminals were confiscated by
the Board.8 The statute required that publishers and
others who acquire literature rights notify the Board
before paying out money to a criminal author."
However, the small amount of monies confiscated
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was due in part to the lack of compliance by publi-
cists in turning over their contract to the Board and
the Board's reluctance in enforcing the statute
because of constitutional concerns.20, The attempted
application of this statute to the best-selling novel by
Nicholas Pileggi, entitled Wiseguy: Life in a Mafia
Famil, brought Executive Law 632-a under constitu-
tional attack for the last time in the case of Simon &
Schuster v. New York State Crime Victims Board.2'
B. The Constitutionality of New York's
"Son of Sam" Law
The facts of Simon & Schuster v. New York State
Crime Victims Board arose in 1986 when a publishing
company, Simon & Schuster, published an autobio-
graphical, non-fiction book about the life and mafia
career of Henry Hill." The author, Nicholas Pileggi,
spent hundreds of hours interviewing Hill about his
past criminal activities, which included bribery,
assault, extortion, theft, burglary, arson, drug dealing,
credit card fraud and murder.23 Upon publication of
the book, the Board informed Simon & Schuster
about Executive Law 632-a and requested a copy of
their contract for review.2' The Board ordered Simon
& Schuster to stop all payments to Hill's literary
agency in connection with the book and demanded
Hill forfeit $96,250 in proceeds already paid to him.
Henry Hill and Simon & Schuster resisted turning over
the earnings from this book.
On August 3, 1987, Simon & Schuster commenced
an action against the members of the New York State
Crime Victims Board requesting an order that New
York Executive Law 632-a violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments." Simon & Schuster argued
that the "Son of Sam" law regulated speech based on
its content and the identity of the speaker, which vio-
lated the First Amendment. 6 Furthermore, they argued
that this law had a chilling effect on speech by "inter-
fering with the publishing and editorial decisions of
publishers and writers" and curtailing the availabilty
of sources for non-fictional stories.27 They argued that
most criminals would not offer to tell their stories
without compensation, thus, the statute obstructed the
free market place of ideas by robbing the public of
such literature.,' Finally, Simon & Schuster argued the
statute had been applied arbitrarily and was without a
clear and neutral standard, thereby violating the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.29 Simon & Schuster's challenge to
Executive Law 632-a eventually led to its demise.
The district court concluded that Executive Law
632-a had only an "incidental" effect on speech
because "the state's interest in compensating crime
victims is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion.";" The court found this interest to be "substan-
tial," thus withstanding constitutional muster." As
well, the court held that the statute's effect "is limited
to the non-expressive elements of the activity: receiv-
ing a profit." 2
The First Amendment issues in this case received
more careful consideration by the court of appeals.
The Second Circuit ruled that "the statute ...imposes a
direct, rather than an incidental burden on speech
and therefore must meet the requirements of the strict
scrutiny test to survive constitutional challenge. ""3
The appellate court found two compelling state inter-
ests: "preventing criminals from profiting from their
crimes," and "assuring that a criminal not profit from
the exploitation of his or her crime, while the victims
of that crime are in need of compensation by reason
of their victimization."34 Thus, the court of appeals
concluded that the statute was narrowly drawn to sat-
isfy the compelling state interest of compensating vic-
tims of crimes out of the proceeds of the sale of a
criminal's story, thereby withstanding strict scrutiny
review.35
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to
make the final determination as to whether Executive
Law 632-a was inconsistent with the First
Amendment's protection of free speech. Publishers
were pleasantly surprised when a unanimous
Supreme Court deemed New York's "Son of Sam" law
unconstitutional, thus reversing the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals.-, The Court looked to earlier prece-
dent in determining the First Amendment implications
of this law. In Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland,
the Supreme Court reviewed the use of a content-
based magazine tax and held that "official scrutiny of
the content of publications as the basis for imposing a
tax is entirely incompatible with the First Amend-
ment's guarantee of freedom of the press."37 In
Leathers v. Medlock, the Court ruled that a tax
imposed only on cable television services, excluding
other media, was not an unconstitutional, differential
taxation."8 The Court reasoned there that the legisla-
tive intent was not to restrict speech based on its con-
tent; however, the Court admitted that a statute is
"presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment
if it imposes a financial burden on speakers because
of the content of their speech.""
The Simon & Schuster Court stated that whether
the speaker was considered to be Henry Hill, whose
income was confiscated and placed in an escrow
account because of the story he told, or the petition-
er, Simon & Schuster, Inc., which was limited to pub-
lishing books about crime with the aid of only those
criminals willing to forego compensation for at least
five years, the law places a financial disincentive only
on speech of a particular content.4 ' The Supreme
Court previously ruled "the fact that society may find
speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for sup-
pressing it."4' Accordingly, the "Board disclaims, as it
must, any state interest in suppressing descriptions of
crime out of solicitude for the sensibilities of
readers."42
Justice O'Connor, who delivered the Court's opin-
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ion, acknowledged two legitimate compelling state
interests: ensuring victims are compensated by those
who harm them and ensuring criminals do not profit
from their crimes.43 The first interest was already
accomplished through tort laws, pre-judgment reme-
dies and restitution.44 Likewise, the second interest
was fulfilled by statutory provisions for the forfeiture
of the fruits of a crime.45 Notably, the Supreme Court
failed to recognize a third compelling interest the pro-
tection of crime victims from "secondary victimization
due to the repeated exposure of the often heinous
criminal acts."' Unnecessary publicity can cause
much pain to crime victims, thus making the deter-
rence of such acts an arguably compelling interest.47
The Board attempted to narrow the implications
of the statute to that of merely compensating the vic-
tims first and then allowing the criminals to regain
their profits in five years. But the Board could not jus-
tify using the proceeds from these books to compen-
sate victims, while not using the criminal's other
assets or other fruits of the crime for compensation.'
Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that the "distinction
drawn by the 'Son of Sam' law has nothing to do with
the state's interest in transferring the proceeds of
crime from criminals to their victims," but is merely a
method of suppressing a certain form of speech. 9
In holding that Executive Law 632-a unconstitu-
tionally burdened free speech, the Supreme Court
concluded the "Son of Sam" law was not narrowly tai-
lored but was, in fact, "significantly overinclusive."0
The Court found fault in the statute's ability to sup-
press an author's expression about crime, however
"tangentially or incidentally."" In addition, the appli-
cation of the statute to a "person convicted of a
crime" implicated the work of individuals who were
never prosecuted for a crime but admitted to criminal
activity in their book."2 The statute, for example,
would apply to a book in which the author admitted
to criminal activity in one single paragraph, although
the entire book was hundreds of pages in length. The
breadth of this law could have suppressed such great
works as The Autobiography of Malcolm X, which
documented certain criminal activity of Malcolm X;
Civil Disobedience, in which the author, Henry David
Thoreau, admitted to tax evasion; and The
Confessions of Saint Augustine, in which the author
admitted to stealing a pear from a neighbor's tree.53
Although these examples may seem extreme, counsel
for the Board admitted that the profits from these spe-
cific works would have been escrowed under New
York's "Son of Sam" law.5 4 Finally, because of the
law's overinclusiveness, the Court declined addressing
the question of whether the statute was content-neu-
tral.55
For those who closely follow the Supreme Court's
opinions on free speech, this decision may have been
incongruous, considering the Court's recent approval
of state limitations on expression. 6 However, the
Supreme Court declined to analyze any of the other
states' "Son of Sam" statutes or the federal govern-
ment's law because some of these laws were quite
different from New York's.57 The Court may be lean-
ing towards increased First Amendment protection,
especially with a recently elected liberal Executive
branch and an upcoming Supreme Court appointment
by President Clinton.
C. National Survey of Other
"Son of Sam" Laws'8
Since the origin of New York's "Son of Sam" law
in 1977, the federal government and forty-two states
have enacted similar statutes.5 9 These statutes are
unaffected by the Supreme Court decision in Simon &
Schuster until they face an independent challenge,
although the statutes which are similar to New York's
will probably not survive constitutional review if liti-
gated. ° It will be necessary for these states and the
federal government to examine the constitutionality of
their "Son of Sam" laws in light of the Simon &
Schuster decision. So far, New Jersey is the only state
which has proposed an amendment to its "Son of
Sam" statute." This new bill added language to the
original New Jersey statute to clarify that an "integral
part of the defendant's work must depict or discuss
the defendant's crime" in order for the proceeds of
the contract to be subject to the statute. 2 As well, the
new statute deleted the section which included within
the purview of the statute "reenactments... from
expression of the person's thoughts, feelings, opin-
ions or emotions regarding the crime.
6 3
Virtually all of the statutes have the same purpose
-to compensate the crime victims."' Many states have
enacted statutes which do not focus on suppressing
speech or escrowing funds, but rather focus on seek-
ing restitution from the criminal from any financial
sources or assets, in order to compensate the victim."*
For example, Maine has a statute which states that
any prisoner "who is able to generate income, from
whatever source, shall pay twenty-five percent of that
income to any victim if the court ordered that restitu-
tion paid."" This statute would probably withstand a
Supreme Court challenge because it does not focus
on speech and is narrowly tailored, thus avoiding a
conflict with the First Amendment.
The nature of the criminal activity necessary to
invoke a "Son of Sam" law varies widely from state to
state. Only five states require the commission of a
felony crime in order to fall within the purview of
their "Son of Sam" laws. 7 Ten other states and the
federal government define the relevant crime as "one
involving violence or personal injury."68 The rest of
the states apply their statute to any crime, regardless
of the degree of the offense.
As described by one commentator, almost all of
the statutes contain language limiting their authority
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to "monies received as a result of specific expressive
activity by the individual accused or convicted of the
crime; this expressive activity is defined in terms of its
content."' , Although many states follow the language
of the original New York law, some states go further.
For instance, Montana's law regulates all expression
"relating to" the predicate crime and Ohio's law
applies to all expression referring to "any part of the
defendant's life story ...if the publication's value results
in part from notoriety brought by commission of an
offense." Nevada's statute allows for seizure of not
only the profits received from speech, but also other
payments which one receives based on his notoriety
as an offender.7 Rhode Island's law applies to any
paid expression, while Wyoming's is limited to reen-
actments.72
As to the status of the criminal, only nine states
and the federal government limit their statutes' appli-
cation to persons who have already been convicted.73
Most of the other statutes provide that those merely
"accused" of a crime will have their revenues
sequestered but they will be refunded by the state if
they are not convicted.7 1 However, three states pro-
vide a means by which victims can seize these
monies even from defendants who are aquitted. 71
Finally, twenty-sLx state statutes and the federal law
provide that "all or a substantial part of the monies
sequestered under their provisions shall be forfeited
even if no victims come forward to make demands
for compensation. '"7",
The next section examines the revisions which
have been incorporated into New York's "Son of
Sam" law in an attempt to comply with the First
Amendment analysis in Simon & Schuster.
Il1. NEW YORK'S REVISED
"SON OF SAM" LAW
On August 13, 1992 Governor Mario Cuomo
signed a new "Son of Sam" law under which criminals
will again be required to surrender profits made from
their expressions about their life story as a criminal.7
Governor Cuomo appears confident that the new bill
will withstand a constitutional challenge because it
does not concentrate on speech for any particular
burden; he feels that "instead, the bill implements
broadly, wisely and fairly a vision of essential justice
between those who have been hurt and those who
have hurt them."7
The new law attempts to correct the flaws which
led to its demise in the Supreme Court on December
10, 1991. First, the revised law applies only to felony
crimes, which is a significant change from the old law
which applied to all crimes. 79 Second, the new law
applies to any proceeds generated from the commis-
sion of a felony crime, thus acting as a general attach-
ment law and not merely as a seizure of the profits
derived from the expression of ideas, although such
profits are still encumbered. 8 Third, the new law
applies only to those persons convicted or formally
charged with a crime, not merely those accused of a
crime or who admit to a crime for which they are
never prosecuted.81 Nevertheless, the new law does
not contain language limiting its application only to
works which focus predominantly on the author's
criminal acts.
The statute allows judges in criminal cases to
order reparation by defendants, thus acting as a prior-
ity lien for victims to collect any assets the criminal
might acquire.82 As well, the new statute extends,
"from one to seven years, the maximum time a victim
would have to file for civil damages from a crimi-
nal."83 Finally, the statute provides a three year statute
of limitations for victims to sue for damages which
runs from the date of discovery of any profits of the
crime."
Free speech advocates feel that any attempt to
seize an author's profits gained from telling his life
story is a First Amendment violation., They say the
new law violates the constitutional right to free
speech in the same manner as the old law, but under
the new definition a burden would not be placed
exclusively on speech.," Presumably, "profits of a
crime" could embrace other earnings based on
knowledge and expertise gained through a life of
crime.87 For example, the revised law could arguably
include monies paid to burglars who have become
security consultants and fees paid to ex-addicts for
drug counseling.'
New York's revised "Son of Sam" law is no longer
a content-based regulation, which is a step towards
gaining constitutional acceptance. However, the
statute may continue to be challenged on the basis of
its incidental effect on free speech. The next section
proposes the elements of a constitutional "Son of
Sam" law.
IV. DRAFTING A CONSTITUTIONAL
"SON OF SAM" STATUTE
The Supreme Court analysis in Simon & Schuster
provides some guidance in drafting victims' compen-
sation statutes. Justice O'Connor's opinion implied a
statute that is narrowly tailored to advance the com-
pelling interest of compensating victims from the
fruits of a crime would pass constitutional muster."
Thus, "all that the opinion definitely requires is the
law be limited to those book royalties which can be
said to constitute the proceeds of a crime."9' Arguably,
a "Son of Sam" statute that limits its application to
books which focus on the author's crime would not
be overinclusive in the manner described by Justice
O'Connor.9'
First, it is necessary to consider whefher book
royalties can be considered the proceeds of a crime.92
According to New York's forfeiture statute, proceeds
of a crime include "any property obtained through the
commission of a felony crime.""' This has been inter-
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preted to mean that the property be "directly related
to criminal activity.""' The Supreme Court may not
accept the notion that book royalties derive directly
from criminal activity, due to the intervening act of
the criminal author telling his story. For example,
Henry Hill spent over three hundred hours discussing
his story with Nicholas Pileggi, the writer of
Wiseguy." This is a considerable amount of time and
effort which occurred subsequent to any criminal
activity, arguably breaking the chain of relation.
Conversely, book royalties could be considered to be
the proceeds of a crime in the sense that the crime is
a necessary and absolute prerequisite to writing the
book and receiving the proceeds. Without the crime,
the criminal would have no story to tell and therefore
no profits to earn from telling about his life. Thus, it
may be necessary to draft a statute that more specifi-
cally defines "proceeds of a crime," or this determina-
tion may need to be analyzed on a case by case basis.
Further, it may be necessary to add language to the
statute that considers whether the author received
notoriety prior to his criminal activity, thus making his
lifestory valuable regardless of his crimes. For exam-
ple, Mike Tyson was a well-known heavyweight fight-
er prior to his highly publicized rape conviction.
Therefore, the profits from any autobiographical
movie or book written about his life may not be con-
sidered the direct proceeds of a crime.
Another issue which should be confronted in a
constitutional "Son of Sam" law is the problem of
under-inclusiveness, an issue raised by Justice
Blackmun in his Simon & Schuster concurrence.96
Arguably, most "Son of Sam" laws are under-inclusive
because they only seize criminal profits received from
expressive speech, but do not seize other proceeds
from the particular crime.97 The states' failure to con-
fiscate any criminal proceeds other than those derived
from protected speech strongly suggests that "Son of
Sam" laws are not tailored to obtain the objective of
compensating crime victims from all crime proceeds,
"but are rather narrowly tailored to accomplish the
impermissable purpose of preventing criminals specif-
ically from profiting by writing about their crimes."8
The problem of under-inclusiveness could be cured
by providing for the "forfeiture of all fruits of crime
from whatever source derived." 99 However, this
approach would encompass works such as St.
Augustine's Confessions, which would not further the
government's interest of compensating victims with
the fruits of a crime. Additionally, a statute that confis-
cated all of a criminal's assets would still place a bur-
den on speech.
An ideal "Son of Sam" statute should be drafted
using very specific and careful language, so as not to
be over-inclusive or under-inclusive. First, the statute
should apply only to crimes with identifiable victims.
Second, the statute should also require conviction; it
should not apply to the proceeds of works in which
the author "admits" to a crime or in which the author
has merely been "accused" of a crime. The applica-
tion of the statute to the latter goes against the basic
premise of our legal system-innocent until proven
guilty. Third, the statute should apply to all proceeds
of the crime in general and not just proceeds from
criminal reenactments in movies or novels. However,
the statute should not consider as "proceeds of a
crime" literary works in which the overriding theme is
not the criminal acts of the author, but merely include
incidental references to criminal activity. As well, the
author should be notorious exclusively for his com-
mission of the expressed criminal acts. Although a
new statute will most likely be contested again as
unconstitutional, it is vital for legislators to comply
with the Court's analysis in Simon & Schuster in order
to protect both the interest of crime victims and the
freedom of speech of the criminal.' °°
V. CONCLUSION
The "Son of Sam" laws are a valid and important
means of compensating crime victims. However, if
Governor Cuomo's amendments or those proposed in
this article do not cure the constitutional problems in
the eyes of the Supreme Court, this method of com-
pensating victims may not remain constitutionally
valid. If this should occur, criminal codes could be
amended to allow the imposition of large fines in
extremely notorious cases, when the court feels that
the criminal might stand to gain an enormous profit
from telling his life story.' 10 States could then confis-
cate any earnings to satisfy the judgment.0 2 A narrow-
ly tailored "Son of Sam" law may not confiscate the
profits gained by all criminals for telling their story,
but it may withstand constitutional review and com-
pensate those victims who are the focus of these
widespread laws.
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